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Abstract
This paper develops a two-sector growth model in which institu-
tional investors play a signicant role. A necessary and su¢ cient con-
dition is established under which these investors own the entire capital
stock in the long run. The dependence of the long-run growth rate
on the behaviour of such investors, and the e¤ects of a productivity
increase are analysed.
JEL classication. O41, O43
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1 Introduction
In the Keynes-Kaldor-Pasinetti post-Keynesian growth model [1] two classes
of agent, workers and capitalists, save constant proportions of their income.
On a balanced growth path the rate of prot is independent of the workers
savings propensity. Meade (1963)[2] and Samuelson and Modigliani (1966)[3]
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prove an "anti-Pasinetti" theorem which establishes the existence of an al-
ternative balanced growth path on which pure capitalists cease to exist and
all capital is owned by workers. Kaldor (1966)[4] proposed an alternative
insitutional setting for post-Keyensian growth theory in which large capital-
ist corporations play an important role in savings and investment decisions.
This kind of corporate economy is described in Marris (1964) [5], Marris and
Wood (1971) [6], Wood (1975) [7] and Eichner (1976, 1985) [8] [9]. Moss
(1978) [10] extends Pasinettis analysis to a corporate economy by dividing
Kaldors (1966) household sector into workers and nancial capitalists whose
income arises only from nancial capital. OConnell (1985, 1995) [11] [12]
develops an alternative approach to the corporate economy, showing that the
"anti-Pasinetti" theorem does not hold when rms re-invest a proportion of
their prots. Commendatore (1999) [13] extends the Post-Keynesian growth
model to a corporate economy, analysing the e¤ects of rm and shareholder
behaviour. Feldman (1928) [14] and Mahalanobis (1953/4) [15] analyse the
e¤ects of investment allocation on economic growth. This analysis is ex-
tended to a multi-sector model by Araujo and Teixeira (2011) [16].
In this paper we consider a two-sector model in which institutional in-
vestors such as pension funds, unit trusts, insurance companies have an im-
portant role. It reects Pasinettis idea that workers must own the capital to
which their savings have given rise, but also acknowledges that, in a modern
capitalist economy, these savings are typically mediated by institutions such
as pension funds. Dinenis and Scott (1993) [21] argue that pension funds
are a major vehicle for personal long-run saving in the UK economy. They
report that such funds controlled over £ 250bn of funds in 1989, their total
net assets constituting 38% of personal sector net nancial wealth. These
funds owned 23% of UK equity, 21% of British government securities and
18% of British holdings of foreign equity. Apilado (1972) [20] investigates
whether pension savings in the US economy between 1955 and 1970 are a
substitute for other forms of saving. He concludes that they were in fact an
addition to other forms of saving and that, via an increase in total saving,
generated an increase in the growth rate. Pension funds have obligations
to pay pensions and in many juridstictions (e.g. the UK) pensioners are
allowed to withdraw a proportion of their pension pot prior to retirement.
Workerssavings/consumption decisions are not explicitly modelled in this
paper: rather insitutional investors are assumed to invest a proportion s < 1
of their income, where s is treated as exogenous.
Van Groezen et. al. (2007) [17] develop a two-sector growth model with
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a capital intensive commodity sector (with endogenous growth) and a labour
intensive services sector. They analyse the e¤ects on economic growth of
a switch to a more funded pension scheme. In this model increased savings
resulting from the pension reform generate higher growth in a closed economy
provided capital and labour are not strong substitutes. However, the opposite
is true for a small open economy. Hachon (2010) [19] analyses the e¤ect of
the structure of pension systems on the growth rate. He contrasts "purely
Beveridgian" pension systems, where every agent receives the same pension,
with "purely Bismarckian" systems, where pensions depend on agentswages.
Hachons focus is on the redistributional e¤ects of pensions, in similar vein
to a paper of Docquier and Paddison (2003) [18].
Pasinetti was concerned to provide a normative description of the eco-
nomic system, focussing on the physical requirements for reproduction. But
his insights can be re-interpreted as providing a positive analysis of modern
capitalism. In such an economy savings and investment are mediated by
institional investors. So two questions arise naturally:
 Will the long-run growth rate in such an economy be determined by
the behaviour of institutional investors and, if so, how?
 Will insitutional investors own the entire capital stock in the long run?
 What are the implications for long-run growth and capital ownership,
of a one-shot productivity increase?
All three questions are analysed below. A capitalist economy with in-
stitutional investors works in a complicated way, but adopting and develop-
ing Pasinettis insights allows an analysis of these questions which is simple
enough to be tractable.
2 Structure of the model
In an economy with institutional investors, investment and hence growth are
likely to be inuenced by the decisions of such investors. But under modern
capitalism there are many high technology rms (e.g. IT, software) which
present institutional investors with substantialy greater problems of risk and
asymmetric information than rms with less dynamic technologies (e.g. con-
sumer durables). It is therefore reasonable to assume a correlation between
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technological level and the degree to which accumulation is nanced from
retained prots. We refer to capital accumulated from retained prots as
"corporate capital", and that accumulated through institutional investment
as "institutional capital". To capture this distinction in a two-sector model
we assume two di¤erent production sectors at opposite ends of this "tech-
nology spectrum". Sector 1 consistes of high technology, capital intensive
rms which invest all their prots, and also obtain investment from outside
institutional investors. It produces an output Q1 using labour L1 and cap-
ital K1. Sector 2 consists of medium technolgy, less capital intensive rms
whose investment expenditure comes exclusively from outside institutional
investors. It produces an output Q2 using labour L2 and capital K2:Total
output of the economy will be denoted Q = Q1 +Q2; total labour employed
in the economy will be denoted L = L1 + L2; total capital employed in the
economy will be denoted K = K1 +K2.
Both factors are assumed perfectly mobile, equalising wage and prot
rates between the two sectors. Capital is assumed fully employed, but there
may be unemployed labour in the economy. Outside institutional investors
receive income based on wages (e.g. pension contributions) and from prots
earned on their portion of the capital stock. They invest a proportion, s, of
their income, of which a share, 1   , goes to sector 1 and , goes to sector
2. We establish conditons under which the growth rate of the economy is
independent of the institutional investorsbehaviour: in this case the share
of the capital stock funded from retained prots remains strictly positive.
There is also a balanced growth path along which the growth rate depends
on the behaviour of institutional investors; in this case the share of the capital
stock funded from retained prots disappears in the long run and the entire
capital stock is owned by institutions.
3 Wage and prot rates
Sector 1 consists of high technolgy rms with capital-output ratio k1 =
K1
Q1
and output-labour ratio q1 =
Q1
L1
. Sector 2 consists of medium-tech rms
with capital-output ratio k2 =
K2
Q2
and outout-labour ratio q2 =
Q2
L2
. It will
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be assumed that:
q1 > q2 and k1 > k2 (1)
Togther these inequalities imply that:
K1
L1
>
K2
L2
(2)
Wage prot-frontiers can readily be derived for the two sectors. Let w
denote the wage rate and r the prot rate. Then:
Q1 = wL1 + rK1 ) (3)
1 =
w
q1
+ rk1 (4)
And:
Q2 = wL2 + rK2 ) (5)
1 =
w
q2
+ rk2 (6)
The two wage-prot frontiers are illustrated in gure 1.
w
q1
q2
w*
r*                  1/k1                         1/k2       r
Figure 1. Wage-prot frontiers for sectors 1 and 2.
5
Inter-sectoral mobility of the two factors ensures that wage and prot
rates are determined at the intersection of the two frontiers yielding:
w =
k2   k1
k2=q1   k1=q2 (7)
and:
r =
q2   q1
k2q2   k1q1 (8)
Note that the wage-prot frontiers do not assume full employment of
labour: the availability of labour is never a constraint on growth. Capital is
assumed fully employed, and both factors are assumed instantaneously and
costlessly mobile between the two sectors.
4 Capital accumulation
Sector 1 (high-technology) rms will be assumed to re-invest all their prots
and also to receive a share  of institutional investment. So let K1 = X + Y
where X = "corporate capital" (i.e. that portion of sector 1 capital funded
from retained prots) and Y = "institutional capital" (i.e. that portion
of sector 1 capital funded by outside institutions). Sector 2 (medium-tech)
rms will be assumed to fund their capital accumulation entirely from outside
institutional sources. For notational consistency let Z = K2. Institutional
investors own a portion Y + Z of the capital stock. Assume all capital
depreciates at a rate . It is shown in the Appendix (Proposition 1) that
X ,Y and Z are governed by the linear dynamical system given by equations
(9,10,11) below:
_X = (r   )X (9)
_Y = [(1 )s

tw
k1q1
+ r

 ]Y +(1 )s

tw
k2q2
+ r

Z+
(1  )stw
k1q1
X (10)
_Z = s

tw
k1q1
+ r

Y + [s

tw
k2q2
+ r

  ]Z + stw

k1q1
X (11)
6
It is further established in the Appendix (Propositions 2 and 3) that
this dynamical system has two di¤erent types of steady state, depending on
whether or not the condition:
stw
(1  s)

1  
k1q1
+

k2q2

 r (12)
is satised. Now dene shares in the total capital stock:
x =
X
K
; y =
Y
K
; z =
Z
K
(13)
We focus on a condition necessary and su¢ cient for the insitutional in-
vestors to own the whole economy in the steady state (that is x = 0 or
Y + Z
K
= 1 in the steady state).
4.1 Steady state 1
It is shown in the Appendix (Proposition 2) that, the dynamical system
consising of equations (9,10 and 11) converges to a steady state in which
x > 0 and the growth rate is given by g = r   if and only if Condition (12)
is satised. In this steady state, the long-run growth rate does not depend
on the savings behaviour of institutional investors, and they do not own the
whole economy in the long-run.
4.2 Steady state 2
It is shown in the Appendix (Proposition 3) that, the dynamical system
consising of equations (9,10 and 11) converges to a steady state in which
x = 0 and the growth rate is given by 2 = stw

1  
k1q1
+

k2q2

+ sr   
if and only if Condition (12) is violated. In this steady state, the long-run
growth rate does depend on the savings behaviour of institutional investors.
In particular it increases with t (proportion of the wage bill received by
institutional investors), s (the invested proportion of institutional investors
income) and  (the proportion of that investment that goes to sector 1 (high
tech) rms). Moreover, in this steady state, institutional investors own the
whole economy in the long-run.
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5 Numerical simulations
A simple Matlab program was written to simulate the dynamical system of
section 4 above. Parameters and initial conditions were set as in Table 1
below:
 depreciation rate 0.02
k1 capital/output ratio in sector 1 3.5
k2 capital/output ratio in sector 2 2.5
q1 output/labour ratio in sector 1 10.5
q2 output/labour ratio in sector 2 10.0
X(1) corporate capital (initial value) 45.0
Y (1) institutional capital in sector 1 (initial value) 25.0
Z(1) institutional capital in sector 2 (initial value) 30.0
Table 1
This implies equilibrium wage and prot rates of w = 8:936 and r =
0:043 respectively. The economy simulated is thus one which, initially con-
tains a signicant high tech sector, with accumulation nanced prodomi-
nantly from retained prots. Initially, it also includes a medium tech sector,
nanced by institutional investors. Table 2 shows values of x (share of cor-
porate capital in total capital stock) at time = 20 and the growth rate at
time = 20 for various values of the parameters. The rst four lines of the
table relate to parameter combinations which satisfy condition (12), so that
the long-run share of corporate capital in the total capital stock (x) is non-
zero, and the long run growth is independent of the investorsparameters (it
is equal to r    = 0:023). The next two lines of the table relate to para-
meter combinations which violate condition (12), so that the long-run share
of corporate capital in the total capital stock (x) is zero and the long run
growth rate does depend on investorsparameters, according to the equation
of section 4.2 above.
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s t  x(20) growth rate at LR value of x LR growth rate
time = 20
0.3 0.05 0.3 0.55 0.0121 0.87 r    =
0.3 0.05 0.9 0.55 0.0132 0.87
0.3 0.20 0.3 0.45 0.022 0.48 0.023
0.3 0.20 0.9 0.45 0.025 0.40
0.5 0.20 0.3 0.35 0.036 0.0 0.029
0.5 0.20 0.9 0.33 0.042 0.0 0.036
Table 2
Figures 2 and 3 show output for the simulations described in the rst
and fourth lines of table 1, corresponding to a low institutional savings ratio
(0:3). In the rst case the share of corporate capital in sector 1 trends
upwards towards an upper limit of 0.87. In the second case the share of
corporate capital in sector 1 trends downwards towards a limiting value of
0.40. In both cases the long-run growth rate is independent of institutional
investorsparameters, being equal to r    = 0:023. Figure 4 shows output
for the simulation described in the last line of table 1, corresponding to a high
institutional savings rate (0:5). In this case the share of corporate capital
in sector 1 trends downwards towards zero. The long run growth rate now
depends on institutional investorsparameters. At 0.036 it is signicantly
higher than the long-run growth rate of gures 2 and 3.
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0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
time
corporate capital in sector 1
institutional capital in sector 1
institutional capital in sector 2
Fig 2. Output of simulation for s = 0:3; t = 0:05;  = 0:3
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0.25
0.3
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Fig 3. Output of simulation for s = 0:3; t = 0:2;  = 0:9
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Fig 4. Output of simulation for s = 0:5; t = 0:2;  = 0:9
6 Increase in productivity
We now consider the e¤ect of an increase in labour productivity in sector
1 (high-tech) with all else (including labour productivity in sector 2) held
constant. Figure 5 depicts the wage-prot frontiers for the two sectors. An
increase in labour productivity in sector 1 from q11 to q12 increases the prot
rate from r to r and decreases the wage rate from w to w. It also
a¤ects the income of institutional investors and the proportions of that in-
come arising from the two sectors of the economy. The combined e¤ect on
corporate capital over time is shown in gures 6 and 7. For the high pro-
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ductivity simulations, q1 is set at 12:5; for the low productivity simulations
q1 is set at 10:5. In the former case the wage rate is 6:67 and the prot
rate is 0:133. In the latter case the wage rate and prot rate are as in sec-
tion 6 above, 8:936 and 0:043 respectively. Figure 6 depicts the simulation
output for s = 0:3; t = 0:05;  = 0:3, corresponding to line 1 of table 1, in
which the share of corporate capital increases in the low productivity case
and decreases in the high productivity csae. Figure 7 depicts the simulation
output for s = 0:5; t = 0:2;  = 0:9, corresponding to line 6 of table 1, in
which the share of corporate capital declines much more rapidly in the high
productivity case.
w
q12
q11
q2
w*
w**
r* r**                 1/k1                         1/k2       r
Fig. 5. Wage-prot frontiers for low and high productivity in sector 1.
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0.58
time
high productivity in sector 1
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Figure 6 Share of corporate capital for high and low productivity in sector 1
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Figure 7 Share of corporate capital for high and low productivity in sector 1
7 Conclusions
We analyse an economy in which corporate saving is undertaken by high-
tech rms with high capital/labour ratios and correspondingly high labour
productivity. Institutional saving is undertaken by pension funds, insurance
companies and unit trusts which invest in high and medium tech rms (the
latter having lower capital/labour ratios and correspondingly lower labour
productivity). In high prot economies, the steady state growth rate is inde-
pendent of the behaviour of institutional investors and the steady state share
of corporate capital is non-zero (i.e. the institutions do not own the whole
economy in the long run). In low prot economies the steady state growth
rate does depend on the behaviour of institutional investors. In particular
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it increases with t (proportion of the wage bill received by institutional in-
vestors), s (the invested proportion of institutional investorsincome) and 
(the proportion of that investment that goes to sector 1 (high tech) rms).
Moreover, the steady state share of corporate capital is zero (i.e. the insi-
tutions do own the entire economy in the long run), There is a parallel here
with the "anti-Pasinetti" theorem of Meade (1963)[2] and Samuelson and
Modigliani (1966)[3] which establishes the existence of a balanced growth
path on which pure capitalists eventually cease to exist, and all capital is
owned by workers. In all cases the share of corporate capital declines more
rapidly or rises more slowly if labour productivity rises in sector 1.
8 Appendix
In this appendix we establish the central propositions referred to in the main
text.
8.1 Capital accumulation
Proposition 1 The variables X, Y and Z are governed by the linear dynam-
ical system given by:
_X = (r   )X (14)
_Y = [(1 )s

tw
k1q1
+ r

 ]Y +(1 )s

tw
k2q2
+ r

Z+
(1  )stw
k1q1
X (15)
_Z = s

tw
k1q1
+ r

Y + [s

tw
k2q2
+ r

  ]Z + stw

k1q1
X (16)
Proof. Equation (14 ) follows immediately from the denitions. Institutional
investors will be assumed to have an income V , consisting of a proportion
t of the wage bill (e.g. pension contributions) and the prots they earn on
their portion of the capital stock. We therefore have:
V = tw [L1 + L2] + r [Y + Z] (17)
Using the denitions of section 3, this yields:
V = t

wK1
k1q1
+
wK2
k2q2

+ r [Y + Z] (18)
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Using the denitions of section 4, this yields:
V = t

w(X + Y )
k1q1
+
wZ
k2q2

+ r [Y + Z] (19)
It is now simple to derive accumulation equations for X, Y and Z:
_X = (r   )X (20)
_Y = (1  )sV   Y (21)
_Z = sV   Z (22)
Substituting (19) into (21) and (22) and rearranging gives yields equations
(15) and (16)
Equations (14), (15) and (16) constitute a linear dynamical system in X,
Y and Z. Equation (14) can solved independently to give:
X(t) = X(0)e(r
 )t (23)
Now dene the following shares in the total capital stock:
x =
X
K
; y =
Y
K
; z =
Z
K
(24)
We focus on conditions necessary and su¢ cient for the institutional in-
vestors to own the whole economy in the steady state (that is x = 0, or
Y + Z
K
= 1, in the steady state).
8.2 Dynamics of the model
We rst establish:
Proposition 2 The dynamical system consisiting of equations (14), (15)
and (16) converges to a steady state in which x > 0 and the rate of growth
is given by g = r   , if and only if stw

(1  s)

1  
k1q1
+

k2q2

 r:
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Proof. The dynamical system clearly has g as one eigenvalue. Let the other
two eigenvalues be 1 and 2. The determinant of the dynamical system
is the product of the eigenvalues and the trace is their sum. Thus we may
write:
12 = (   (1  )a2   a3) (25)
1 + 2 = (1  )a2 + a3   2 (26)
where:
a2 = s

tw
k1q1
+ r

and a3 = s

tw
k2q2
+ r

(27)
The solution of these equations, which are symmetric in 1 and 2, is:
1 =   (28)
2 = (1  )s

tw
k1q1
+ r

+ s

tw
k2q2
+ r

   = (29)
stw

1  
k1q1
+

k2q2

+ sr    (30)
Solutions of the dynamical system take the form:
X(t) = X(0)egt (31)
Y (t) = b1e
1t + b2e
2t + b3e
gt (32)
Z(t) = c1e
1t + c2e
2t + c3e
gt (33)
It follows that the system will tend to steady state growth at a rate g if
and only if 2  g, since 1 < 0. We have g = r   , so that 2  g if and
only if:
(1  )s

tw
k1q1
+ r

+ s

tw
k2q2
+ r

 r () (34)
stw

1  
k1q1
+

k2q2

 (1  s)r () (35)
stw
(1  s)

1  
k1q1
+

k2q2

 r (36)
which is the required condition. From equations (31), (32) and (33) it is
clear that, if 2  g; x = X
K
 ! X(0)
b3 + c3 +X(0)
> 0 as t ! 1. That is
x > 0 in the steady state, as required.
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So, provided the condition (36) of proposition 1 is satised, the steady
state growth rate is independent of the behaviour of institutional investors,
and the long-run share of corporate capital in the total capital stock is non-
zero.
We now characterise the long-run growth rate when condition (36) is
violated.
Proposition 3 The dynamical system consisting of equations (14), (15) and
(16) converges to a steady state in which x = 0, and the rate of growth is
given by 2 = stw

1  
k1q1
+

k2q2

+ sr   , if and only if condition (36)
is violated.
Proof. By the argument of Proposition 1, 2 > g if and only if condition (36)
is violated. Then, from equations (31), (32) and (33), the steady state growth
rate must be equal to 2: Moreover, since 2 > g and 1 < 0, x =
X
K
! 0 as
t!1. That is, x = 0 in the steady state, as required.
So, if the condition (36) of proposition 1 is violated, the steady state
growth rate does depend on the behaviour of institutional investors. In par-
ticular it increases with t (proportion of the wage bill received by institutional
investors), s (the invested proportion of institutional investorsincome) and
 (the proportion of that investment that goes to sector 1 (high tech) rms).
Moreover, in this steady state, institutional investors own the whole economy
in the long-run.
References
[1] Pasinetti, L L (1962) Rate of prot and income distribution in relation
to the rate of economic growth, Review of Economic Studies, 29, 267 -
279
[2] Meade, J E (1963) The rate of prot in a growing economy, Economic
Journal, 73, 665-74
[3] Samuelson, P A and F Modigliani (1966) The Pasinetti paradox in neo-
classical and more general models, Review of Economic Studies, 33, 269-
302
19
[4] Kaldor, N (1966) Marginal productivity and the macroeconomic theo-
ries of distribution: comment on Samuelson and Modigliani, Review of
Economic Studies, 33, 309-319
[5] Marris, R L (1964) The Economic Theory of ManagerialCapitalism,
Macmillan, London
[6] Marris, R L and A Wood (1971) The Corporate Economy, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, MA
[7] Wood, A (1975) A Theory of Prots, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge
[8] Eichner, A S (1976) The megacorp and oligopoly: microfoundations of
macrodynamics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
[9] Eichner, A S (1985) Micro foundations of the corporate economy, in A
S Eichner, Toward a new economics, Sharpe, Armonk
[10] Moss, S J (1978) The post-Keynesian theory of income distribution in
the corporate economy, Australian Economic Papers, 38, 303-322
[11] OConnell, J (1985) Undistributed prots and the Pasinetti and dual
theorems, Journal of Macroeconomics, 7, 115-119
[12] OConnell, J (1995) The two/one class model of economic growth, Ox-
ford Economic Papers, 47, 363-368
[13] Commendatore, P (1999) Pasinetti and dual equilibria in a post-
Keynesian model of growth and institutional distribution, Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers, 51, 223-236
[14] Feldman, G A (1928) On the theory of national income growth,
Planovoe Khoziastvo, Gosplan, Moscow
[15] Mahalanobis, P C (1953/4) Some observations on the process of growth
of national income, Sankhya, 307-312
[16] Araujo, R and J Teixeira (2011) A multi-sector version of the post-
Keynesian growth model, in T Boyland and S Raghavendra (eds.) Pro-
ceedings of the VIII International Colloquium on Growth, Structural
Change and Institutions, Galway, Ireland
20
[17] Van Groezen, B, L Meijdam and H Verbon (2007) Increased Pension
Savings: Blessing or Curse? Social Security Reform in a Two-Sector
Growth Model, Economica,74, 736-755
[18] Docquier, F and O Paddison (2003) Social Security Benet Rules,
Growth and Inequality, Journal of Macroeconomics, 25, 47-71
[19] Hachon, C (2010) Do Beveridgian Pension Systems Increase Growth?,
Journal of Population Economics, 23, 825-831
[20] Apilado, V (1972) Pension Funds, Personal Savings and Economic
Growth, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 39, 397-404
[21] Dinenis, E and A Scott (1993) What Determines Institutional Invest-
ment? An Examination of UK Pension Funds in the 1980s, Oxford
Economic Papers, 45, 292-310
21
